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ABSTRACT 
Life-course criminological research suggests that employment can reduce criminal behavior. 
However, it is unclear whether the financial aspects of employment or rather the social control that 
inheres in employment best explains the relationship between employment and reduced offending. 
Using longitudinal information on a sample of men and women (N=540) who were 
institutionalized in a Dutch juvenile justice institution in the 1990’s, this study examines effects of 
employment as well as different types of income support on crime. Random- and fixed-effects 
models show that for men, both work and income support are associated with a reduction in the 
rate of offending. For women, however, while employment is correlated with a lower offending 
rate, receiving income support, and in particular disability benefits, is correlated with a higher 
offending rate. The findings support both theories that stress the financial motivation for crime as 
well as theories that emphasize the importance of informal social control for reducing offending. 
INTRODUCTION 
Life-course criminology argues that making successful transitions to adult social roles facilitates 
desistance from offending during the young adult years. A successful transition to the labor market 
seems especially important in this respect, as unemployment has repeatedly been found to be 
related to adult crime (Lageson and Uggen, 2013). Being employed provides potential offenders 
with a source of income thereby diminishing their financial motivations for committing offenses. 
In addition, continued involvement in work may provide potential offenders with a structured daily 
routine, a social network of conventional colleagues and a sense of meaning and self-worth which 
they are increasingly unlikely to be willing to jeopardize by engaging in criminal behavior. 
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Research indeed shows that being employed is associated with increased psychological well-being 
in adults (Hulin, 2002).  
 Yet, not all young adults are able to successfully transition into the labor market and some 
suffer from – sometimes prolonged – periods of unemployment. Individual characteristics, like 
low educational achievement, may render some youths particularly vulnerable for unemployment, 
especially during periods of economic downturn. To provide a social safety net for society’s most 
vulnerable members, the Netherlands has developed a relatively generous system of income 
support that ensures those who are needy of a minimum income (De Gier and Ooijens, 2004). 
Although the transition to employment is the ultimate goal, the idea is that those who are unable 
to (find) work should nevertheless be supported. By reducing inequality through the redistribution 
of income, the Dutch welfare state aims to avoid poverty and social exclusion, thereby preventing 
people from turning to illegal means to make ends meet (De Mooij, 2006). 
One group of young adults for whom the transition to the labor market is particularly 
precarious, consists of those youths who in their adolescent years displayed serious behavior 
problems and were consequently institutionalized in a juvenile justice institution (Verbruggen, 
Blokland, and Van der Geest, 2012).1 Experiencing problems in multiple life domains, these 
youths face difficulties in adopting adult roles (Chung, Little and Steinberg, 2005). Firstly, these 
youths often grow up in adverse family environments, and their parents may be unable or unwilling 
to support them in their transition to adulthood (Schoeni and Ross, 2005). Secondly, these youths 
often have little personal capital, as most have acquired little education and many suffer from 
psychological or psychiatric problems. Thirdly, these youths can experience difficulties due to 
stigma generated by their involvement in government systems such as child protection service or 
the juvenile justice system, their stay in a juvenile justice institution, and a criminal record. While, 
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compared to non-vulnerable youths, previously institutionalized youths need to overcome 
additional hurdles, they can and sometimes do make a successful transition into adulthood and end 
up leading normal, conventional lives (Osgood et al., 2005). 
Since the Dutch income support system is especially designed to function as a safety net to 
support vulnerable groups, the question arises to what extent previously institutionalized youths, 
vulnerable to failure in their transition to adulthood and at risk of developing extended criminal 
careers, actually profit from receiving benefits. Does governmental support prevent them from 
turning to illegitimate means to provide for themselves? How does the effect of governmental 
support compare to the effect of employment, which not only provides income, but also workplace 
social control and social capital, which are thought pivotal in promoting criminal desistance (Laub 
and Sampson, 2003)? These questions guide the current study. 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
WORK AND CRIME 
A steady stream of research investigates the individual-level relationship between employment 
and crime (for reviews, see Bushway and Reuter, 2002; Uggen and Wakefield, 2008).2 Studies 
among (young) adults generally find a negative effect of employment on criminal offending. For 
example, some studies have demonstrated that young adults committed more crimes during periods 
of unemployment than when employed (Farrington, et al., 1986; Fergusson, Horwood and 
Woodward, 2001). Furthermore, research showed that being employed was correlated with 
reduced recidivism rates in samples of ex-offenders (MacKenzie and De Li, 2002; Uggen, 2000). 
The limited available research on women suggests that the crime reducing effect of employment 
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pertains to both male and female offenders (e.g. Griffin and Armstrong, 2003; Uggen and 
Kruttschnitt, 1998). Yet, it is usually not clear what aspects of work – income or informal social 
control – yield the most salient crime prevention benefits. A notable exception is a study by 
Grogger (1998) showing that, for young men, wage growth accounts for a substantial portion of 
the decline in criminal participation with age. 
 A smaller body of research examines non-wage features of employment that constitute 
informal social control. For instance, research by Sampson and Laub (1990) demonstrates that job 
stability leads to a reduction in adult criminal behavior in a sample of juvenile delinquents followed 
until age 32. Similarly, Crutchfield and Pitchford (1997) studied the effect of labor market 
segmentation, and showed that young adults employed in primary sector jobs are more likely to 
experience job stability, and are therefore less likely to engage in crime than young adults 
employed in secondary sector jobs. Wadsworth (2006) demonstrated that job quality is associated 
with less property and violent crime, while job stability and higher wages did not have a significant 
effect on crime. Furthermore, Uggen (1999) showed that high-quality jobs lowered the chances of 
both property crime and non-income generating crime in a sample of ex-offenders. 
Finally, Savolainen (2009) examined the effect of employment on crime in Finland, and 
showed employment to reduce recidivism in a sample of offenders. He argued that, since Finland 
provides generous benefits to the unemployed, the non-monetary aspects of work must make the 
largest contribution to desistance. An interesting feature of this study is its context: the system of 
income support in Finland is more comparable to the Dutch regime than the American regime. 
INCOME SUPPORT AND CRIME 
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While previous scholarship has investigated the relationship between government spending on 
income maintenance programs and crime at a high level of aggregation, there is a stark absence of 
research on the relationship between income support and criminal behavior at the individual level.3
The most persuasive strand of research is that on transitional aid for released prisoners. Berk, 
Lenihan, and Rossi (1980) evaluated the Transitional Aid Research Project (TARP), a randomized 
study of men and women leaving prisons. The authors found that unemployment benefits during 
the reentry period significantly reduced arrest frequency (for both property and non-property 
crimes) during the year following prison release. However, they also discovered that these benefits 
created a work disincentive, which had the countervailing effect of increasing recidivism risk 
indirectly through fewer weeks of employment. Thus the net or “reduced-form” effect of TARP 
on recidivism was null.  
Other studies produced more favorable findings about unemployment insurance. Mallar 
and Thornton (1978) evaluated an experimental program that provided income support and job 
placement assistance to men leaving prison. The income support element of the program was 
successful in reducing the probability and frequency of arrest (for robbery, burglary, or larceny) 
one year after prison release. Furthermore, Berk and Rauma (1983) studied the impact of 
unemployment benefits on recidivism among released prisoners who participated in prison 
vocational training programs. They found that receipt of income support significantly reduced the 
likelihood of post-release recidivism during the first year when measured as parole revocation 
and/or return to prison. A follow-up study confirmed the significantly lower recidivism risk of 
program participants out to five years post-release (Rauma and Berk, 1987). 
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These prior studies however were all carried out in the United States. Given that the US 
and many Western European countries differ greatly in their labor market and system of social 
benefits, the extent to which results from these studies generalize to the Dutch context is uncertain. 
THE DUTCH WELFARE STATE 
Esping-Anderson (1990) developed a typology in which income support regimes are classified by 
their degree of “decommodification,” or the extent to which individuals are protected from the 
vicissitudes of the market and granted income support and other social services “on the basis of 
citizenship rather than performance” (1990:21). Social democratic regimes, such as those found 
in Scandinavian countries, have highly decommodified policies providing universal entitlements 
with generous benefit levels. Conservative regimes, which include many countries in continental 
Western Europe, provide for comparatively strong entitlements but make benefit levels dependent 
on contributions. Liberal regimes, characteristic of Anglo-Saxon nations, have highly 
commodified policies that impose strict eligibility criteria and provide for minimal benefits. In the 
foregoing typology, the Netherlands tends to display elements of both conservative and social 
democratic regimes.  
The Dutch income support system consists of two main parts (De Gier and Ooijens, 2004; 
De Mooij, 2006).4 The first component consists of social insurance systems, which are compulsory 
and non-means tested. Employed people are obliged to contribute to these insurances by paying a 
percentage of their wages, and the benefits are wage-related. Two types of social insurances can 
be distinguished: unemployment insurance and disability insurance. The goal of unemployment 
insurance is to replace the income lost to employees who lose their job. Disability insurance is 
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meant to deal with the risk of becoming unable to work, either due to physical or mental health 
problems. The second component consists of public assistance, the most important being welfare
assistance, which is meant to assure recipients with a minimum income. Such benefits do not 
require proof of anything other than financial need, nor are they conditional on past contributions. 
Public assistance is paid from general funds and every resident of the Netherlands is in principle 
eligible to receive it. The amount of income support under each of these programs is linked to the 
statutory minimum wage – which is in turn approximates 70% of the modal wage. Unemployment 
and disability benefits usually comprise between 70-75% of the statutory minimum wage. 
Eligibility for unemployment benefits currently may last from three to 38 months depending on 
one’s employment history, after which one is transferred to the welfare system. Those on welfare 
receive between 60-70% of the legal minimum wage, counting additional special benefits and 
depending on their living conditions. Eligibility for disability benefits depends on whether the 
individual is totally and durably unfit to work due to a medical condition. Though these medical 
conditions can pertain to both mental and physical health, in practice most young adults receiving 
disability benefits suffer from psychiatric or psychological conditions.5 Unlike eligibility criteria 
in some other countries, such as in the US, social welfare payments in the Netherlands are never 
declined because of a criminal history. Only when an individual is being incarcerated, eligibility 
to social welfare stops temporarily. 
 The Dutch welfare state took shape in the post-war period when many income support 
policies were implemented, and developed into a generous system of entitlements. Due to 
economic crises however, in recent years policies have been implemented to reduce the 
expenditures of the welfare state, and reform of the income support system is still ongoing in 
efforts to keep the system affordable in the light of such trends as the aging of the population (De 
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Gier and Ooijens, 2004; De Mooij, 2006). Despite these reforms, the Netherlands still has an 
extensive and, compared to other countries, relatively generous social redistribution system. In 
fact, the Dutch welfare state is regarded as one of the most advanced in the world (Cantillon 2004). 
THEORY 
In order to understand the possible effects of employment and income support on criminal 
behavior, this study appeals to theories emphasizing motivations and controls. Theories rooted in 
motivations begin with the observation that crime is more heavily concentrated among individuals 
who are unemployed and living in poverty. Merton’s strain theory (1938, 1968) explains that, 
when legitimate opportunities for the acquisition of monetary success are blocked or unavailable, 
individuals are motivated to “innovate” in the most expedient manner, often through criminal 
behavior (see also Cloward and Ohlin, 1960). While contemporary versions of Merton’s theory 
rely less heavily on a class-based conception of strain (e.g. Agnew 1985, 1992), crime is 
nevertheless viewed as a way to alleviate income pressures from unemployment and poverty. 
Similarly, theories rooted in neoclassical economics explain that individuals faced with financial 
strain are motivated to substitute or supplement with criminal earnings (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 
1973).  
According to theories emphasizing motivations, then, the loss of legitimate income is 
determinative for understanding the link between unemployment and crime, and even more 
specifically, between unemployment and property crime. Yet in a decommodified society, as in 
the Netherlands, unemployed individuals are entitled to receive fairly generous government 
benefits. Since employment and income support both provide legitimate sources of income 
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reducing financial strain, they should both reduce the attractiveness of criminal behavior. 
However, as income support yields lower monetary benefits than paid employment, income 
support might not achieve the same level of crime reduction as paid employment. So, despite 
potential level differences, both employment and income support should yield benefits with respect 
to the control of crimes of an instrumental nature (i.e. property crime).  
Theories rooted in controls point to characteristics of employment other than (or in addition 
to) earnings. According to Hirschi’s social control theory, people who are employed experience 
supervision and socialization from employers and coworkers, and possess work schedules which 
limit the amount of time available for criminal involvement (Hirschi, 1969; see also Shover, 1996: 
98). Unemployed individuals, on the other hand, lack the structure and routines which correspond 
to steady labor market participation. In addition to these more or less direct social controls, 
employment provides a means of informal social control over unlawful behavior (Sampson and 
Laub, 1993). Attachment to a high-quality, stable job provides people with feelings of 
responsibility, usefulness, and competence. Over time, this culminates in growth in social capital, 
suggesting that employed individuals have increasingly more at stake than just the monetary 
benefits of work (Laub and Sampson, 2003, Sampson and Laub, 1993). 
According to theories emphasizing controls, then, erosion in work attachment and loss of 
social capital are determinative for understanding the link between unemployment and crime. The 
long-term effects of unemployment include decreased well-being, feelings of inferiority, and 
hopelessness (Paul and Moser, 2009), which would be expected to increase the risk of serious 
offending, encompassing both crimes of property and violence. Because of the special character 
of employment as a source of social control as opposed to strictly income, a theoretical implication 
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is that receipt of income support should be far less consequential for criminal offending, by 
comparison.  
GENDER DIFFERENCES IN MOTIVATIONS AND CONTROLS 
Important for the current study is the realization that employment, income support, and crime are 
highly gendered. A gendered analysis has implications for the salience of social institutions in 
adulthood, and consequently for the dominant forms of government entitlements. While rates of 
employment do not differ substantially for contemporary cohorts of young men and women, 
experiences in the labor market are nevertheless highly gendered, whereby men receive higher 
wages and are more often employed full time than women. Employment also remains central to 
masculine identity, especially for those living on the lower rungs of the social ladder 
(Messerschmidt, 1993; Willott and Griffin, 1999). If men feel more pressure to be breadwinners, 
then unemployment may be more criminogenic for them. In as far income support provides an 
adequate monetary substitute to employment for men to meet their financial obligations, income 
support may have a crime reducing impact for men. Yet, if men perceive a job as more than just a 
source of income, unemployed men may turn to criminal behavior even when they receive income 
support as an alternative route to assert their masculinity. So, while unemployment itself may be 
more criminogenic for men compared to women, unemployment benefits may work less well for 
men than for women, because men, who derive a stronger sense of identity from being employed, 
may seek for ways to escape stress, boredom or low self-esteem when they are unemployed. 
Feminine identity, on the other hand, remains family centered and prioritizes marriage and child 
rearing, both of which constitute additional forms of social control over behavior. As a result, 
effects of unemployment on crime may be less outspoken for women compared to men. These 
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gendered priorities are formalized in the two-tiered system of income redistribution (Haney, 2000; 
Orloff, 1996; Sainsbury, 1996). Namely, income support for men is employment focused, whereas 
it is family or health focused for women.  
THE CURRENT STUDY 
In the current study, a group of previously institutionalized youths, at high risk of developing 
persistent criminal careers, is followed as they transition into adulthood. Using longitudinal data 
collected up to age 32, we examine the effects of employment and different sources of income 
support on these vulnerable youths’ overall offending, as well as property and violent offending. 
The following research questions and hypotheses guide the analysis. 
What are the effects of employment and income support on offending? Based on theories 
that emphasize the financial motivation for crime, both employment and income support, because 
they provide a legitimate income source, should reduce offending. On the other hand, following 
theories which emphasize the informal social control that inheres in employment, employment 
should reduce offending more so than income support. 
Are there different effects of income support on offending, depending on the source of 
support? Unemployment insurance, public assistance, and disability benefits will be distinguished. 
Given that public assistance yields the lowest monetary benefits, the effects of unemployment 
insurance and disability benefits on crime should be the most pronounced, by comparison.  
Do the effects of employment and income support differ for property crime versus violent 
crime? In addition to an analysis of total offending, property and violent crime will be considered 
separately. Support for motivational theories will be provided by results which suggest stronger 
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effects of employment and income support on property offending than on violent offending. On 
the other hand, support for control theories will be provided by equally strong effects of 
employment and income support on both property and violent offending, as well as stronger effects 
of employment compared to income support.  
Do the effects of employment and income support differ for vulnerable young men versus 
vulnerable young women? Vulnerability, employment, income support, and crime are gendered, 
even in a highly egalitarian society such as the Netherlands. Unfortunately, clear predictions about 
whether or how gender modifies the effects of employment and income support on crime are not 
easily made, and often produce contrary expectations.  
Although there is a substantial body of research on the employment-crime relationship, 
individual-level research on the relationship between income support and crime is surprisingly 
scarce, and the existing research was carried out decades ago. In addition to filling this gap, the 
current study seeks to make several other contributions to scholarship. First, the study of 
vulnerable groups, like the institutionalized youths in the current sample, is much needed. Previous 
research shows that vulnerable youths face serious challenges on the road to adulthood as a result 
of their high-risk background, institutionalization, and criminal record (e.g. Caspi et al., 1998; 
Osgood et al., 2005; Verbruggen et al., 2012). 
Second, it is important to study such a vulnerable group in an international context. Most 
research on employment, income support, and crime comes from the United States, where the 
income support regime is vastly different from that of many European countries. Since the Dutch 
welfare state specifically aims to prevent crime by redistributing income, an important unanswered 
question is to what extent the relatively strong entitlements in the Netherlands are successful in 
supporting vulnerable young people and preventing them from turning to crime.  
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 Third, this study examines effects of income support and employment on crime in a 
contemporary sample of men and women. Most previous longitudinal research looks at older 
cohorts who came of age in a very different socio-historical context (e.g. Sampson and Laub, 
1990), and it routinely excludes vulnerable women (for exceptions, see Giordano et al., 2002; 
Griffin and Armstrong, 2003; Uggen and Kruttschnitt, 1998). Furthermore, labor market 
participation, wage schedules, and income support are highly gendered, and have undergone 
substantial changes in recent decades. This study is thus capable of shedding light on the effects 
of employment and income support on crime under present-day conditions. 
METHODS 
SAMPLE 
The study relies on data from the 17up study, a longitudinal study following institutionalized 
youths into adulthood.6 The sample of the study comprises 270 boys and 270 girls who were 
institutionalized in a juvenile justice institution in the Netherlands between 1989 and 1999. At the 
time of sampling, juveniles could be institutionalized in a juvenile justice institution on either a 
criminal law measure, or under a civil law measure, yet research shows that these populations do 
not tend to differ in terms of their background characteristics (Boendermaker, 1999; Wijkman, 
Van der Geest & Bijleveld, 2006). In this sample, 56 boys (19.6%) and 7 girls (2.6%) received 
treatment in the institution based on a criminal law measure; all others were treated under a civil 
law measure. After they had been discharged, the boys and girls were observed from ages 18 to 
32, or if this occurred sooner until emigration (n=6) or death (n=20). 
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CRIMINAL CAREER 
Information on offending is based on convictions registered in the judicial documentation abstracts 
of the Netherlands Ministry of Security and Justice. These abstracts contain information on every 
case that is registered with the public prosecutor’s office, the type of offense, the date of 
commission of the offense, and the ensuing verdict. As with all studies using official data, the 
analyses presented here pertain to offenses that came to the attention of the public prosecutor and 
most likely underestimate the actual number of crimes committed. 
For this study, we estimate the effects of employment and income support on three different 
dependent variables. First, the dependent variable is the frequency of convictions. Convictions 
pertain to a wide range of offenses, such as violent offenses, property offenses, serious public order 
offenses, drugs offenses, and weapon offenses (following a classification used by Loeber et al., 
1998). Minor offenses such as vandalism and traffic violations are excluded from the analyses. In 
addition, motivated by theoretical considerations, we separately examine the effects of 
employment and income support on two subsets of offending: property crime and violent crime.7
EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME SUPPORT 
Employment and income support data were collected from the national database of the Ministry 
of Social Affairs and Employment. This database contains information about periods of 
employment and income support at the individual level. In this database, the start date and end 
dates of employment contracts, as well as all types of income support received during different 
periods, are registered. In addition, the trade register managed by the Netherlands Chamber of 
Commerce was accessed. This trade register contains information about business ownership, and 
allows us to identify subjects who are self-employed. 
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In this study, for every given year, we examine two sources of income an individual could 
have had. Employment is the proportion of each person-year that subjects were employed on a 
work contract. Income Support is the proportion of each person-year that subjects received some 
kind of cash transfer. The latter is further classified into whether the income support was for 
unemployment, public assistance, or disability. Note that employment and income support are not 
mutually exclusive states in a given person-year: individuals could both be employed and receive 
benefits during the same year.  
Some cautionary notes apply to using these data in the manner described. First, the 
employment database does not provide information about the number of days worked per week, 
the type of job, or the actual wages earned. An unknown amount of contracts may therefore refer 
to part-time jobs yielding low wages. However, given that the number of person-years in which 
respondents were both under an employment contract and received unemployment benefits or 
public assistance was low (9% and 8% respectively), in the current data, this situation seems 
largely hypothetical. Second, although the database distinguishes between different types of 
income support, it lacks information on the exact amount of money received. This means that we 
are unable to test to what extent the amount of pay/benefits received is related to changes in 
offending. Third, although all official employment contracts are registered in the employment 
database, we lack information about undeclared work. Estimates based on population surveys 
show are that around 10% of the Dutch population engages in undeclared work and that that 
percentage is lower (2-7%) among those receiving benefits – possibly due to differences in the 
perceived likelihood of getting caught (CBS, 2012). Finally, as the database used became only 
fully computerized from 1998 onwards, employment participation rates before that time may 
underestimate actual employment levels. Given the possible underestimation of employment prior 
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to 1998, the effects of employment on crime reported in this study should be interpreted as 
conservative estimates.  
CONTROL VARIABLES 
Time-stable and time-varying regressors pertaining to sociodemographic measures, personal 
characteristics, and criminal history are included in the analyses to control for possible selection 
effects. The sociodemographic indicators include time-varying indicators for age, marriage, and 
children, as these have been related to the likelihood of offending (e.g. Blokland and Nieuwbeerta, 
2005). Information about marriage and parenthood was collected from the Dutch Municipal 
Population Register.  
Personal characteristics were extracted from subjects’ treatment files, which were compiled 
during their stay in the juvenile justice institution. These treatment files contain for example 
psychological and psychiatric reports, and reports from the Dutch Child Protection Board. Prior 
studies link low intelligence and academic achievement to delinquency (e.g. Hawkins et al., 1998; 
Loeber et al., 2012). We therefore included binary measures of intelligence (low intelligence 
versus average or above average intelligence) and the level of education before institutional 
treatment (special education or elementary education only versus average education or above 
average education). Research also indicates that, for boys, childhood aggression is linked to adult 
crime (e.g. Babinski, Hartsough and Lambert, 1999; Piquero et al., 2012). A measure of childhood 
aggression (yes/no) was therefore added. Indicators of the individual ever being a victim of sexual 
abuse (yes/no) or physical abuse history (yes/no) were included as research finds victimization of 
these types is associated with increased delinquency (e.g. McGrath, Abbott Nilsen, and  Kerley, 
2011; Mersky, Topitzes, and Reynolds, 2012). Furthermore, a number of family risk factors have 
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been repeatedly related to delinquency and crime (Murray and Farrington, 2010), therefore a 
measure indicating to what extent respondents were exposed to alcohol abuse, substance abuse, 
family members with a criminal history, or unemployment in the family was included. This 
measure ranges from 0 to 4.
The criminal history measures include time-invariant variables for the number of 
convictions prior to age 18 (as registered in the judicial documentation), the age at which subjects 
entered the juvenile justice institution, and the length of their confinement in the institution. The 
time-varying criminal history measures, constructed annually from ages 18 to 32, include dummy 
variables for having been convicted or incarcerated in the previous year, in addition to the total 
accumulated convictions and time spent incarcerated (in years) as of two years ago. These are 
included to distinguish the short-term, state-dependent effects of recent criminal conviction and 
incarceration from any long-term, cumulating effects.  
EMPIRICAL MODEL 
The effects of employment and income support on criminal conviction are estimated from ages 18 
to 32. The dependent variable, Yit, is a count of the number of convictions received by individual 
i (i = 1,…,N) at time (age) t (t = 1,…,Ti). It is distributed negative binomial with the rate parameter 
(lambda) specified in familiar log-linear form: 
In this model, Ageit is modeled as a quadratic, Employmentit is the proportion of the year employed 
on a work contract, Supportit is the proportion of the year receiving income support, Wi includes 
time-invariant control variables (e.g., length of stay at the institution, personality characteristics), 
and Xit includes time-varying control variables (e.g., marriage, children, prior convictions). The 
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model makes an exposure adjustment in order to control for “street time,” meaning it accounts for 
the proportion of each person-year that a subject is not incarcerated (or deceased) and thus has the 
opportunity to commit crime.  
The individual effect in the equation above, ui, represents so-called “unobserved 
heterogeneity” across individuals, referring to unmeasured differences in conviction risk that are 
stable over time. In this analysis, ui is treated both as random and as fixed. The random-effects 
(RE) estimator assumes that ui varies continuously in the population, which makes it comparatively 
efficient but assumes the individual effect to be orthogonal to the regressors. Violation of the latter 
assumption renders RE inconsistent because of selection bias due to time-invariant unobservables. 
The fixed-effects (FE) estimator is based solely on within-individual variation, and relaxes the 
distributional and orthogonality assumptions concerning the unobserved heterogeneity.8 The main 
advantage of performing a within-person analysis is the possibility to eliminate potential sources 
of bias by controlling for stable (observed and unobserved) personal characteristics.  
While it has comparative advantages under certain circumstances, FE is not necessarily a 
panacea. It is inconsistent if there is selection bias due to time-varying unobservables. For this 
reason, rigorous controls for prior conviction and incarceration are included in the model. Also, 
the model does not allow one to control for simultaneity bias resulting from possible reverse 
causality between crime, work and income support. Causal inferences should thus be made with 
caution. The FE estimator also sacrifices efficiency, not to mention that it is incapable of estimating 
parameters for time-invariant regressors (Wi). A test known as the Hausman test formalizes this 
tradeoff (Hausman, 1978), with large values indicative of favoring a FE over a RE model.9
Note that all models are estimated separately for men and women, and tests of coefficient 
equality for the measures of employment and income support will be conducted (see Brame et al., 
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1998). Furthermore, separate models will be estimated for property and violent offending. For 
these, RE and FE logistic regression models are estimated. In order to facilitate comparisons of 
employment and income support for property and violent outcomes, the models are jointly 
estimated by way of “seemingly unrelated regression” (Zellner, 1962, 1963). In this approach, the 
two dependent variables are “stacked” into a single model, with a dummy indicator for each 
outcome (except one, which serves as the reference outcome) interacted with all of the regressors.  
RESULTS 
DESCRIPTIVES 
Descriptive statistics on the variables used in the empirical models are provided in Table 1. 
**Table 1** 
Personal Characteristics and Retrospective Criminal Careers 
As described elsewhere (Verbruggen et al., 2012), the sample is characterized by a vulnerable 
background. Information from respondents’ treatment files indicates that intelligence of about one-
third of the men and women is below average, and that almost one-third of the men and one-quarter 
of the women attained a level of education that was below average. Almost two-thirds of men and 
women displayed aggressive behavior. Women were more often than men victim of abuse when 
they were young. Finally, more girls (65.6%) than boys (37.8%) grew up in a problematic family 
environment, and the families of girls were characterized by twice as many adverse conditions, on 
average.  
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 For the men in our sample, the average age of entry into the juvenile justice institution was 
15.6 (SD = 1.7), and the average stay in the institution was 20.8 months (SD = 12.2). The average 
woman was slightly younger when she entered the institution (M = 15.4, SD = 1.2), and her stay 
was about six months shorter (M = 13.4 months, SD = 7.8). The majority of men (80.7%) and 
women (55.6%) were convicted of at least one offense prior to age 18, and the men had a more 
extensive criminal history than did the women. 
Prospective Criminal Careers 
During the observation period, from ages 18 to 32, over 75 percent of men and over 40 percent of 
women were convicted of at least one offense. Among these offenders, the average number of 
convictions for males is almost three times as high as for females. With regard to convictions for 
property and violent crimes, a similar picture emerges: more men than women are convicted, and 
the average number of convictions is higher for men. The age distribution of criminal conviction 
follows the typical age crime curve, showing a peak in conviction likelihood in the middle teens 
(at 45% for males, 21% for females), after which there is a steady decline with age.  
Employment and Income Support 
From ages 18 to 32, the overwhelming majority of men (85.6%) and women (83.7%) are employed 
at least once. However, the work careers are highly unstable, as indicated by the fact that men are 
employed for only 0.26 of each person-year (SD = 0.40), and women for 0.22 (SD = 0.37), on 
average. A large part of the sample (64.4% of men, 83.3% of women) receives income support at 
some point during the observation period as well. Men more often receive income support due to 
unemployment, while women more often receive public assistance and disability benefits. The 
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gender differences with respect to specific forms of income support are quite large, corroborating 
the notion that support is primarily employment focused for men, and family or health focused for 
women. Furthermore, gender differences in income support in a given year are substantial –
income support is received in 0.29 of each person-year among women (SD = 0.43), but only 0.09 
among men (SD = 0.25).  
It is noteworthy that there is also a considerable period of time, especially early on in the 
observation period, in which subjects are neither employed nor receiving income support. Though 
given the limitations of our data we can only speculate, it seems unlikely that many of the men and 
women enroll in full-time schooling after leaving the institution and therefore do not work or apply 
for support. A more plausible scenario is that during this time they temporarily are supported by 
parents, family members or romantic partners until they find their way in the system and are able 
to secure more permanent sources of income (Verbruggen, Van der Geest, and Blokland, 2014).10
EFFECTS OF EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME SUPPORT ON OFFENDING 
The results showing the effects of employment and income support on offending are provided in 
Table 2. Random-effects models are estimated in the top panel, while fixed-effects models are 
estimated in the bottom panel. In Model A, the effects of employment and income support are 
estimated, with controls for marriage and parenthood, personal characteristics, and criminal 
history. In Model B, the three types of income support (unemployment insurance, public 
assistance, and disability benefits) are distinguished.
**Table 2** 
Before turning to the coefficients for employment and income support, the control variables 
are discussed. Men with more convictions prior to age 18, and who were convicted or incarcerated 
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in the previous year, have a significantly higher post-age 18 conviction rate. With regard to 
personal characteristics, men with low intelligence were convicted more frequently in any given 
year. Women with a longer criminal history prior to age 18 and a conviction in the previous year 
have a significantly higher conviction rate. In addition, the models show that women who were 
older when they entered the juvenile justice institution, and who stayed longer in the institution, 
have a significantly higher conviction rate.  
With regard to the effects of employment and income support, the results in Model A show 
that for men, both sources of income are associated with a significant decrease in the rate of 
offending. A test of the equality of the coefficients for employment and income support shows that 
employment is significantly more strongly correlated with offending than income support (z-test 
of the difference is -2.31). When we consider the type of income support (Model B), the results 
show that public assistance and disability benefits are both associated with a decrease in the 
number of convictions, whereas receipt of unemployment insurance benefits is uncorrelated with 
offending. While some of the Hausman tests favor the fixed-effects coefficients over their random-
effects counterparts, the same conclusions are reached across the random- and fixed-effects 
models. 
For women, Model A suggests that employment is also associated with a significant 
reduction in the rate of offending. In contrast to men, however, income support is positively but 
insignificantly correlated with women’s conviction rate. Similar to men, a test of the equality of 
the coefficients for employment and income support shows that employment is significantly more 
strongly correlated with offending than income support (z-test of the difference is -5.07). Model B 
reveals that the positive association between income support and offending for women is driven 
entirely by disability benefits. Results are similar in the random- and fixed-effects models, and 
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most of the Hausman tests favor the random-effects coefficients. Interestingly, comparing the 
coefficients for men and women demonstrated that the effects of employment on offending are 
statistically indistinguishable for men and women, while the effects of income support, and public 
assistance and disability benefits in particular, do differ significantly for men and women.  
COMPARISON OF PROPERTY AND VIOLENT OFFENDING 
The effects of employment and income support on property crime appear to be similar to the effects 
on overall offending (Table 3). Model A for men shows that employment and income support are 
both associated with a lower probability of a property crime conviction. When distinguishing 
between different types of income support in Model B, the results of the random-effects model 
indicate that public assistance and disability benefits are negatively and significantly correlated 
with property offending. However, the Hausman test favors the disability coefficient from the 
fixed-effects model, which is not statistically significant. 
**Table 3** 
For women, Model A shows that the probability of a property crime conviction is significantly 
lower for those who are employed, while income support is unrelated to conviction. In Model B, 
disability benefits are associated with a higher likelihood of a property crime conviction, but only 
at 10 percent significance. These results are further supported by the fixed-effects models. Again, 
employment effects on property offending are not significantly different for men and women, 
whereas income support effects, and specifically the effects of disability benefits, differ for men 
and women.   
Finally, with regard to violent crime, Table 4 indicates that employment is associated with 
a significant reduction in the likelihood of conviction for a violent crime among both men and 
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women, while income support is uncorrelated with conviction for both samples. It is also notable 
that the coefficients in the male property crime model are substantially larger than their 
counterparts in the male violent crime model. The “seemingly unrelated regression” results 
indicate that for men, both employment and income support are more strongly correlated with 
property offending than violent offending. For women, no significant differences in the effects of 
employment and income support on property and violent offending were found. Finally, for violent 
offending, no gender differences in the effects of employment and income support were found.   
**Table 4** 
DISCUSSION 
This study used individual-level, longitudinal information on a sample of vulnerable youths 
(N=540) who were treated in a Dutch juvenile justice institution in the 1990s and who, because of 
a multi-problem background, were at increased risk of experiencing difficulties in the transition to 
adulthood. Officially registered data were collected on convictions, employment contracts, and 
government benefits from ages 18 to 32. The question driving the analysis concerned the 
differential effects of employment and types of income support on offending by high-risk men and 
women. In doing so, this study aimed to shed light on the extent to which theories that stress the 
financial motivation for crime and social control theories are able to explain reductions in 
individual offending rates. 
Results show that a large part of the sample engages in criminal behavior in adulthood. 
Men outnumber women with regard to participation and frequency of offending. Furthermore, for 
both men and women, convictions for property crimes are more common than for violent crimes. 
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In addition, the vast majority of the sample is employed at some point during the observation 
period, however, there is also a high percentage of benefit recipients, especially among women. 
Women more often than men receive public assistance and disability benefits, while men more 
often receive income support due to unemployment. 
Random- and fixed-effects models were used to estimate effects of employment and 
income support on crime. This analytic strategy enabled us to control for possible selection effects 
in the relationship between employment, income support and crime. Both static and dynamic 
control variables were included in the random-effects models, and the findings from these models 
were largely supported by the results of the fixed-effects models – models that strictly control for 
selection effects by focusing only on within-individual change. 
The findings show that, even when rigorously controlling for selection effects, employment 
and income support are significantly related to offending. Employment was found to be inversely 
correlated with offending in general, and with both property and violent offending in particular. 
This was consistently observed among both high-risk men and women. Receipt of income support, 
on the other hand, was inversely correlated with offending among high-risk men, and only with 
respect to property offending. While receipt of income support was largely uncorrelated with 
offending among high-risk women, this masked a positive correlation between the receipt of 
disability benefits and offending.  
What do these findings mean for theories about employment, income support and crime? 
To begin with, the finding that for both men and women, employment is associated with lower 
levels of offending, could be interpreted as evidence for theories that stress the financial motivation 
for crime, as employment provides a legitimate source of income (Agnew, 1992; Becker, 1968; 
Ehrlich, 1973; Merton, 1968). Moreover, when distinguishing between property and violent 
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offending, employment was found to have a significantly stronger relation with property offending 
than with violent offending, which suggests that crime is (at least partly) financially motivated. 
Furthermore, for men, income support was found to be related to a significantly lower rate 
of overall offending as well as property offending, strengthening the financial motivation 
explanation. There were however differences with regard to different types of income support. 
Public assistance and disability benefits in particular were associated with a reduction in overall 
and property offending, which, especially with regard to public assistance, is contrary to what was 
expected given that in most cases income from these other types of support will be lower compared 
to those from unemployment benefits.  
However, although reduced financial motivation might explain the lower offending rates, 
in particular among the men in our sample, the finding that employment is associated with lower 
levels of offending is also in line with theories that argue that employment provides social control 
and changes in routine activities which can help reduce offending (Laub and Sampson, 2003, 
Sampson and Laub, 1993). Furthermore, employment is more strongly associated with offending 
than income support, indicating that next to merely receiving an income, the non-monetary aspects 
of work, such as social control or reduced opportunity to engage in crime due to changes in daily 
routine activities, are important in reducing criminal behavior. Moreover, employment is not only 
associated with lower levels of overall offending, but also with property and violent crime 
separately. This too points to the importance of social control and structured routines in refraining 
from criminal behavior, as violent crimes are generally not committed for financial gain.  
The findings thus suggest that the informal social control that inheres in employment is 
important in explaining the reduced offending rates for both men and women, even though women 
are more likely to work part-time and might attach less value to work than men (De Beer 2005; 
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Harding and Sewel 1992; Rossi 1998). This might be due to the fact that over the past decades, the 
gap in employment participation between men and women has become smaller, and therefore, 
work as a source of informal social control might also have become more important for women. 
Strengthening attachment to the labor market therefore has the potential to alter the long-term risk 
of crime among both vulnerable young men and women.
However, the findings indicate that it is difficult to draw general conclusions about the role 
of income in reducing offending, as the results with regard to the effects of income support on 
crime differ importantly for men and women. Whereas for men receiving income support was 
found to be correlated with lower offending rates, thereby providing support for theories that 
emphasize the financial motivation for crime (e.g. Agnew, 1992; Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973; 
Merton, 1968), the effects of income support on crime are less clear for women. Receiving income 
support has a (non-significant) positive relationship with offending for women, which is driven by 
the positive effect of receiving disability benefits. There is evidence from the sample that women 
who receive disability benefits are eligible for them on the basis of psychiatric problems. For 
example, information from the treatment files shows that women possess a more problematic 
personal and family background. This points to the so-called gender paradox in crime: while 
women are less likely than men to engage in crime, those women who do engage in crime often 
show more severe socio-psychological problems than criminal men (Eme, 1992). Prior research, 
for example, has demonstrated that female offenders have greater mental health problems than 
male offenders, and that these mental health problems are related to criminal behavior (Palmer, 
Jinks and Hatcher 2010). It is therefore plausible that eligibility for, and receipt of, disability 
benefits serves as an indicator of a highly sensitive period in the lives of vulnerable women, when 
psychiatric problems are likely to have peaked and the risk for crime is greatest. This is not to say 
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that these women do not profit from receiving financial benefits, but indicates that they need other 
forms of support as well.  
STUDY LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study is the first in the Netherlands, and one of the few worldwide, which examines effects 
of employment as well as income support on criminal behavior at the individual level. However, 
some limitations must be noted.  
First, the analyses compare being employed to receiving benefits. These conditions differ 
both in terms of the earnings yielded as well as in terms of the social control generated. However, 
the data used in this study provide only information about the duration of job contracts and the 
type of benefits received, and not about the number of days per week worked or the amount of 
income actually received, thereby limiting our ability to contrast motivational and control theories 
of offending. Given that being employed usually generates both a higher level of social control 
and better earnings compared to receiving benefits, it remains difficult to disentangle competing 
explanations on the effects of employment on crime based on the data available for the current 
study. Yet, the finding that employment but not income support is associated with reduced violent 
offending suggests that at least part of the added value of employment is non-monetary. Directly 
comparing earnings would have allowed for a more stringent test of these competing explanations.  
Second, while all formal employment contracts and income support benefits are registered 
in official databases, information about undeclared work and unofficial (e.g., familial) financial 
support is regrettably unavailable. With respect to undeclared work, vulnerable youths can end up 
working on the informal labor market, for instance, because their criminal record limits 
opportunities for conventional employment (Pager, 2003). In addition, some young people may 
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live with someone who is capable of supporting them financially. The existence of undeclared 
work and unofficial financial support might partly explain why there is a considerable amount of 
time in which subjects receive no income from either work or government benefits (Verbruggen 
et al., 2014).  
Third, the fixed-effects models used in this study control for time-stable differences, but 
not for time-varying processes. Although marriage and parenthood, which besides employment 
represent two important institutions of social control, are included in the analyses as dynamic 
control variables, we lack information about other dynamic measures, such as alcohol and 
substance abuse problems and (mental) health issues, that might have influenced the relationship 
between employment, income support and offending. Moreover, the analyses have not taken the 
possibility of simultaneity bias into account. The current study was concerned with examining 
effects of employment and income support on crime, however, it is not unlikely that criminal 
convictions also influence employment and safety net use.  
Fourth, we used a calendar-year reference window as the temporal unit in this study, which 
might not be sufficiently fine-grained to study transitions among states of employment, income 
support, and crime, as high-risk individuals often have erratic work histories. It would thus be 
desirable in future research to collect information on a monthly rather than yearly level.  
Finally, it is worth considering the extent to which the findings from this Dutch study can 
be generalized to other societal contexts. In the typology of Esping-Andersen (1990), welfare 
regimes in Anglo-Saxon countries, such as the US and the UK, can be classified as liberal regimes 
in which eligibility criteria are stricter and benefit levels are lower. In light of differences in the 
social safety net, it could be that income support in these countries is differentially related to 
criminal offending because, for example, the benefit levels might be insufficient to relieve 
32 
financial strain to lessen the attractiveness of crime. Moreover, it is important to consider that 
income support can be denied due to criminal history in some US states and other countries.  
Within the limits of the caveats mentioned above, the results of the current study attest to 
the success of the Dutch welfare system to prevent those unable to make a successful transition to 
the labor market from engaging in crime (De Mooij, 2006). The relatively high degree of 
decommodification characteristic for the Dutch system seems to be especially important in this 
respect, given that especially public assistance and disability benefits were related to decreased 
criminal behavior. When evaluating both the accessibility and level of public assistance in light of 
reforms towards a more liberal regime, the Dutch government - as well as those of other countries 
- , would do best to include the crime reducing effect of these types of income support in the 
equation. 
To close, this study provides a first step in understanding how the Dutch welfare state 
impinges on individual criminal behavior. Even though the study pertains to a sample of young 
people from troubled backgrounds, whose labor market participation is below average, whose 
employment careers are highly unstable, and who are more highly dependent on the Dutch welfare 
state, employment was still strongly and consistently correlated with reduced crime risk among 
both men and women. Yet this study points to an additional change agent in the criminal careers 
of vulnerable men. Namely, some forms of government transfer have the capacity to substantially 
alter the risk of crime. Since this is a relatively unexplored field of inquiry in criminology, future 
research using more detailed data and including other welfare regimes will be necessary to shed 
light on why and how the criminal behavior of vulnerable citizens is jointly affected by 
employment and income support. 
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics 
Males (N=270) Females (N=270)
%   /  Mean s.d. %  /  Mean s.d.
Sociodemographic Indicators
Married 22.96% 20.00% 
Child(ren) 35.93% 70.37%
Personal Characteristics
Low Intelligence 26.66% 34.44%
Low School Attainment 31.85% 22.96%
Aggression 64.07% 65.93% 
Sexual Abuse 6.66% 38.15% 
Physical Abuse 32.22% 63.70% 
Problematic Family Environment 37.77% 65.56%
No. Problems in Family 0.54 0.81 1.13 1.09
Criminal History prior to Age 18
Convicted Prior to Age 18 80.74% 55.56%
No. Convictions Prior to Age 18 5.62 4.73 2.36 2.24
Age Entered Institution 15.61 1.69 15.43 1.20
Length of Institution Confinement (in months) 20.76 12.20 13.42 7.83
Criminal Offending from Age 18 to 32
Ever Convicted of a Crime 76.30% 42.75%
Total Convictions 12.06 14.26 4.29 4.75
No. Convictions per Year ˚ 0.90 1.47 0.17 0.36
Ever Convicted of Property Crime 64.81% 30.86%
Total Convictions for Property Crimes 10.15 13.28 3.96 4.40
No. Convictions per Year for Property Offenses ˚ 0.63 1.21 0.11 0.29
Ever Convicted of Violent Crime 49.63% 23.79%
Total Convictions for Violent Crimes 3.71 3.20 1.94 1.57
No. Convictions per Year for Violent Offenses ˚ 0.19 0.41 0.04 0.11
Ever Incarcerated 57.41% 18.21% 
Total Length of Incarceration (in months) 15.22 22.09 3.66 8.17
Employment & Income Support
Ever Employed or Received Income Support 94.07% 94.81% 
Ever Employed 85.56% 83.70% 
Ever Received Income Support 64.44% 83.27%
Ever Received Unemployment Insurance 35.56% 18.96%
Ever Received Public Assistance 31.11% 47.96%
Ever Received Disability Benefits 21.11% 46.47%
Employed or Received Income Support 0.40 0.44 0.59 0.54
Employed‡ 0.26 0.40 0.22 0.37
Received Income Support‡ 0.09 0.25 0.29 0.43
Received Unemployment Insurance ‡ 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.12
Received Public Assistance ‡ 0.03 0.17 0.15 0.34
Received Disability Benefits ‡ 0.03 0.17 0.13 0.32
† Based on NT = 7,102 
‡ Based on NT = 7,983
˚ Corrected for Time Incarcerated 
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Table 2. Effects of Employment and Income Support on Offending for Men and Women 
(Negative Binomial Models) 
Males (N=270) Females (N=267)
Model A Model B Model A Model B
β s.e. β s.e. β s.e. β s.e.
Sociodemographic Indicators
Age‡ –1.06 1.06 –1.14 1.07 –0.54 2.23 –0.31 2.23
Age²‡ 0.14 0.22 0.16 0.22 0.02 0.47 –0.01 0.47
Marriage –0.36 0.22 † –0.37 0.22 † –0.04 0.28 –0.05 0.28
Child(ren) –0.01 0.10 –0.00 0.10 –0.02 0.09 –0.01 0.09
Personal Characteristics
Low intelligence 0.25 0.11 * 0.24 0.11 * 0.25 0.19 0.30 0.20
Low school attainment 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.21 0.12 0.21
Aggression 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.27 0.20 0.25 0.20
Sexual abuse 0.06 0.18 0.05 0.18 –0.09 0.19 –0.10 0.19
Physical abuse 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.11 –0.01 0.18 –0.03 0.18
Problems in family 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.09
Criminal History
Convicted prior to Age 18 0.06 0.01 *** 0.06 0.01 *** 0.14 0.06 * 0.15 0.06 **
Age Entered Institution –0.01 0.04 –0.01 0.04 0.23 0.09 ** 0.22 0.09 *
Length of Institution 
Confinement
–0.01 0.01 –0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 * 0.02 0.01 †
Convicted, t – 1 0.74 0.09 *** 0.74 0.09 *** 0.89 0.19 *** 0.86 0.19 ***
Imprisoned, t – 1 0.16 0.08 † 0.17 0.08 * 0.14 0.22 0.13 0.22
Accumulated Convictions, t – 2 –0.00 0.01 –0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 –0.00 0.03
Accumulated Prison Time, t – 2 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 –0 .25 0.24 –0.27 0.24
Employment & Income 
Support
Employment –1.05 0.14 *** –1.40 0.27 ***
Income support –0.54 0.17 *** 0.22 0.17
Employment –1.05 0.14 *** –1.09 0.27 ***
Unemployment Insurance 0.00 0.37 –1.73 1.35
Public Assistance –0.65 0.23 ** –0.00 0.23
Disability Benefits –0.64 0.28 * 0.42 0.20 *
Fixed Effects Coefficients˚
Employment –0.97 0.15 *** –0.98 0.30 ***
Income support –0.43 0.18 * 0.13 0.19
Employment –0.98 0.15 *** –0.99 0.30 ***
Unemployment Insurance 0.33 0.41 –0.98 1.39
Public Assistance –0.60 0.24 * –0.12 0.26
Disability Benefits –0.48 0.30 0.42 0.24 †
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
‡ Age/10. 
˚ Nmales=204, Nfemales=113. The number of respondents in the fixed-effects models is smaller than in the random-
effects models, because subjects who are never convicted from ages 18-32 are omitted. The fixed-effects 
coefficients in bold indicate those that are favored over their random-effects counterparts based on Hausman tests. 
Otherwise, the tests favor the random-effects coefficients.  
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Table 3. Effects of Employment and Income Support on Property Offending for Men and 
Women (Logit Models) 
Males (N=270) Females (N=267)
Model A Model B Model A Model B
β s.e. β s.e. β s.e. β s.e.
Random Effects 
Coefficients
Employment –1.42 0.23 **
*
–1.21 0.40 **
Income support –0.89 0.30 ** 0 .29 0.25
Employment –1.42 0.23 *** –1.19 0.40 **
Unemployment Insurance –0.62 0.68 –0.35 1.26
Public Assistance –0.88 0.41 * –0.01 0.33
Disability Benefits –1.04 0.51 * 0.50 0.30 †
Fixed Effects Coefficients˚
Employment –1.32 0.25 **
*
–1.06 0.48 *
Income support –0.58 0.31 † 0 .33 0.31
Employment –1.32 0.25 *** –1.10 0.48 *
Unemployment Insurance –0.18 0.72 –0.09 1.50
Public Assistance –0.66 0.40 –0.11 0.38
Disability Benefits –0.65 0.54 0.85 0.43 *
Note: All control variables are included but are not shown to conserve space. The fixed-effects coefficients in bold 
indicate those that are favored over their random-effects counterparts based on Hausman tests. Otherwise, the tests 
favor the random-effects coefficients. 
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.  
˚ Nmales=173, Nfemales=80.  
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Table 4. Effects of Employment and Income Support on Violent Offending for Men and 
Women (Logit Models) 
Males (N=270) Females (N=267)
Model A Model B Model A Model B
β s.e. β s.e. β s.e. β s.e.
Random Effects 
Coefficients
Employment –0.53 0.24 * –0.82 0.42 *
Income support –0.02 0.28 0.26 0.28
Employment –0.53 0.24 * –0.79 0.42 †
Unemployment Insurance ˚˚ 0.56 0.61 --- ---
Public Assistance –0.08 0.38 0.10 0.37
Disability Benefits –0.22 0.46 0.48 0.31
Fixed Effects Coefficients˚
Employment –0.29 0.27 –0.60 0.53
Income support 0.04 0.30 –0.42 0.37
Employment –0.30 0.27 –0.60 0.53
Unemployment Insurance ˚˚ 0.95 0.67 --- ---
Public Assistance –0.18 0.40 –0.55 0.52
Disability Benefits –0.07 0.51 –0.03 0.47
Note: All control variables are included but are not shown to conserve space. The fixed-effects coefficients in bold 
indicate those that are favored over their random-effects counterparts based on Hausman tests. Otherwise, the tests 
favor the random-effects coefficients. 
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.  
˚ Nmales=132, Nfemales=64.  
˚˚ Because there are no women that were convicted of a violent offense and received unemployment benefits in the 
same year, income support due to unemployment was excluded from Model B for women. 
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Notes 
1 Similar to the current study, the study by Verbruggen, Blokland and Van der Geest (2012) used 
data from the 17up study, and examined effects of employment, employment duration, and 
unemployment duration on offending. Verbruggen et al. (2012) found a significant negative 
effect of employment on offending for both men and women. The current study builds upon the 
study by Verbruggen et al. (2012) by comparing the effects of employment to the effects of 
receiving income support on offending.
2 Another research tradition studies the macro-level relationship between economic conditions 
and crime rates. These studies show that crime rates are higher in areas suffering poverty and 
high unemployment, although the correlation tends to be stronger between unemployment and 
property crimes (e.g. Chiricos, 1987; Cook and Zarkin, 1985; Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001).
3 The existing research concerns the relationship between government spending on income support 
programs and crime in cities or metropolitan areas (e.g. Baumer and Gustafson, 2007; DeFronzo, 
1997); in counties (e.g. Burek, 2006; Worrall, 2005); and in nations (e.g. Savolainen, 2000). With 
a few exceptions (Burek, 2006; Worrall, 2005), these studies fairly uniformly conclude that 
localities with more generous income support policies, particularly public assistance programs, 
have lower crime rates.
4 The Dutch system of income support also includes pensions and health care insurance, but given 
the scope of the current study, these are not discussed here.
5 Research among Dutch young adults (mean age 21) receiving disability benefits indicated that 
many were (very) mildly intellectually disabled (37%) or had psychiatric problems (19%). 
Comorbidity of psychiatric problems was high (54%) and many also suffered from additional 
adversities, like problems in the family context (18%). Relatively few (4%) were diagnosed as 
addicted to alcohol or drugs (Holwerda, 2012).
6 See for more information about the sample of the 17up study the article by Verbruggen, 
Blokland and Van der Geest (2012), that also relied on data from the 17up study.
7 Offenses are classified according to the standard classification for offenses in the Netherlands 
(Statistics Netherlands, 2010). Property offending consists of theft, robbery, auto theft and 
carjacking, burglary, embezzlement, fraud, forgery and counterfeiting, and handling of stolen goods. 
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Violent offending consists of (aggravated) assault, intimidation, stalking, kidnapping, (attempted) 
rape, and homicide.  
8 The fixed-effects negative binomial estimator proceeds by maximizing the conditional 
likelihood, where conditioning is achieved by summing across each individual’s Ti observations 
on the dependent variable. This technically makes it a conditional fixed-effects model. It 
necessarily excludes subjects whose observations (here, total number of convictions) sum to zero 
from age 18 onward, resulting in the loss of degrees of freedom.
9 The Hausman test  for a single regressor is distributed as a standard 
normal random variable (i.e., it is a z-test). A “large” statistic (e.g., exceeding ±1.96) constitutes 
a rejection of RE in favor of FE on consistency grounds, while a “small” statistic means either 
that RE is consistent or that FE is so inefficient that its consistency advantage is undermined.
10 The Verbruggen et al. (2014) study examined effects of formal and informal work, as well as 
official and unofficial (e.g. from family or partners) financial support on offending, and relied on 
self-report data that was collected from a sub-sample of the 17up study (N=236). Formal 
employment was associated with a reduced likelihood of offending. Furthermore, unofficial 
financial support was related to a lower probability of offending for men. However, self-reported 
receipt of benefits was associated with an increased likelihood of offending.
